Abstract: Trusting someone in an intuitive, rich sense of t he term involves not just relying on that person, but manifesting reliance on them in the ex pect ation that this manifestation of reliance will increase their reason and motive to prove reliab le. C an trust between people be formed on the basis of Internet contact alone? Forming the required expectation in regard to another person, and so trusting them on som e matter, may be due to believing that they are trustworthy; to believing tha t they seek es teem and will be rationally responsive to the good opinion communicated or promised by an act of trust; or to both factors at once. Neither mechanism can rationally command confidence, however, in the case where people are related only via the Internet. On the Internet everyone w ears the ring of Gyges; everyone is invisib le, in t heir p ersonal identity, to others.
Introduction
Words like "trust" and "reliance" a re used as context requir es, now in t his way, now in that, and they serve to cove r loose, overla pping clust ers of attitud es a n d action s. Here I invoke some theoretical license, h owever , and use t he terms to tag distinct phen omen a : 'relia n ce' a gen eric phen om en on, ' trust' a sp ecies of that genus. I want to argu e that w hile the Inte rnet m ay offer novel, ration al opp ortunities for other forms of relia n ce, it does not gen erally cr eate such op enings for what is her e called trust.
The p a p er is in three sections. In the first, I set up the distinction b etween trust and relia n ce. In the second, I outline som e diffe rent form s t h at t r ust may ta ke. And then in the final section I present some r easons for thinking t h a t trust as distinct from other forms of reliance is n ot well served by interactions on the Internet , a t least not if the interactants are otherw ise unknown to one a n oth er. (The paper is a follow-up to P ettit 1995, a nd draws freely on some a r gum ents in tha t piece.)
The Inte rnet is ex citing in great pa rt b ecause of the way it equ ips each of us to assume differe nt p er son as, unburden ed by pre-given marks of id entity like gen der, age, profession, d ass, a nd so on. A ver y good question, t hen , is wh et her p eople can d evelop trust in one a n other 's p ersonas under the shared assump tion t hat p er son a m ay not correspond to p e rson in such marks of identit y. Supp ose t h a t you and I app ear on the Inte rnet unde r a numbe r of differ ent nam es, d eveloping a st yle tha t d oes with each: I a m b oth Bet sy a nd Bob, fo r examp le, you are b oth J a n e a nd Jim. The question is wh ether you as J ane can t rust m e as Bob, I as Be tsy ca n trust you as Jim, a nd so on. But go od thou gh it is, I should stress that this is not the question that I try to deal with here (Brenna n / P ettit 2004b; McGeer 2004a) . My focus is rather on how far real-world, identity-laden persans may achieve trust in one another on the basis of pure In ternet contact, n ot just how the Internet personas they construct can achieve trust in one anot her on that basis. 
Trust and Reliance
Trust and reliance may be taken as attitudes or as actions b ut it will be useful here to take the words as primarily designating actions: t he actions wh ereby I invest trust in others or place my reliance in them. So what t hen d ist inguishes rely ing on others in this sense from trusting in them?
To rely on others is just to act in a way that is premised on t heir being of a certain character or on their being likely to act under various circumstances in a certain way. It won't do, of course, if the guiding belief abou t ot hers is just t h at they have a low probability of displaying the required character or disposition. The b eliefthat othe rs will prove amenable to on e's own plans must be held with a degree of confidence that clearly exceeds 0.5. To rely on others, as we say, is to m a nifest confidence in d ealing with them that they are of the relevant typ e or a re disposed to behave in the relevant way.
I may rely on others in this sense in a variet y of contexts. I r ely on a u tom obile drivers to r espect the rules of the road w h en I step out on to a p edest rian crossing. I rely on my doctor's being a competent diagnostician when I present myself for a m edical examination. I r ely on the p olice to do their duty wh en I report a crime I have just witnessed. In all of t h ese cases, reliance is a routine and presumptively rational activity. If we a re Bayesians about r a tionality, then we w ill say that such acts of relia nce serve to promote m y ends according to my beliefs and, in particular, tha t they serve to maximize my exp ected u tility.
Relying on oth ers in the sense exemplified h ere is not sh arply distinguishable from r elying on im personal t hings: relying on the strength of t h e bridge, relying on the accuracy of t h e clock, and so on. True, the reliance is something I may exp ect those on whom I rely to notice but this d oes n ot appear to be essent ial. The important point in the cases surveyed is that relying on someon e to disp lay a trait or b eh aviour is just acting in a way that is sh a ped by t h e m ore or less confident belief that t h ey will display it. And relying on a person in that sense is n ot markedly different from rely ing on a non-personal entity like a bridge or a clock or p e rhaps just the weather.
Acts of rational r elia nce on other people, such as our examples illustrate, do n ot count intuitively as acts of trust; certainly, they d o n ot answe r t o t h e use of t h e word 'trust ' t h at I treat h ere as canonical. Trusting someone in t h e sense I have in mind-and it is a sense of trust tha t comes quite n a turally t o usmeans treating him or her as trustworthy. And trea ting someone as t rust wort hy involves assuming a relationship with the person of a kind that need not be involved in just treating someone as relia ble. To treat someone as reliable--say, as a careful driver, a competent doctor, a dutiful police officer-means acting on the confident b eliefthat they will display a certain trait or beh aviour. It wou ld be quite out of place to say tha t whenever I trea t a person as r eliable in this way I treat them as trustworthy. Thus I might be rightly described as presump tious if I described my at titude towards the driver or doctor or police officer as on e of treating the p erson as trustworthy. The washerwarnen of K oen igsberg m ight as well h ave claimed that they treated Kant as trustworthy when t hey relied on him for ta king his afternoon walk at the same time each day.
The cases of reliance given, which clearly do not amount t o t r eating someon e as trustworthy, are all instances of rational reliance, as we noticed. Does t h is mean that when I go beyond mere reliance a nd actually t r ust a person-put my trust in the person-I can no langer be operating in t h e m a n ner of a r a tional agent? Does it mean, as some have suggested, tha t trust essentially involves a leap b eyon d ra tionality, a h opeful but r ationally unwarranted sor t of reliance; if you like, a Hail-Mary version of the p ractice? This su ggestion wou ld leave us w ith a pa radox tha t we might phrase as follows. If t rust is r ational t h en it is not deserving of the name of 'trust '-not at least in my regim ented sense-and if it d eserves the name of 'trust' then it cannot b e r ational.
Happily, however , there is an alternative to this suggestion, and a way beyond this paradox. The assumption behind the suggestion is t h at t he only factor available to mark off ordinary reliance from trust is just the rationality of the relia nce. But this is mistaken. The act s of r elia n ce consider ed are d istinguished, not just by b eing ration al, but also by b eing, as I shall pu t it, inter actively static . And wh at d istinguish es trust from relia n ce is t he interactively d ynamic character of the r elia nce d isplayed, and n ot any n ecessar y failur e of rationality. So a t any r ate I argue.
2
My r elying on others w ill count as inter actively d ynamic when two special condition s a re fulfilled ; oth erwise it will b e static in ch aracter. The first con dit ion required is that the people on whom I rely must b e aware of t h at fac t that I am relying on them to display a certain trait or behaviour; t hat awareness must n ot b e left t o chance-in the paradigm case, indeed , I will have ensured its app earance by use of t h e quasi-performative utterance "I'm t rusting you to ... " . And the second condition required is t h at in revealing my r eliance in t his manner I must b e expecting t h at it will en gage t he disp ositions of my trust ees, giving them an extra m otive or r eason for b eing or acting as I am relying on t hem to be or act . 2 In putting this argument, I aiil not wanting to legislate for the use of the ward ''trust" .
arr1 perfectly happy to ackn owledge t h at the ch aracterization I pr ovide of inter act ively dynarrlic trust do es not catch every variation in u sage, even in the u sage of the ward b eyond the lirnit w h ere it clearly m eans little more t han 'r ely'. My primary interest is in d emarcating a phenom enon that is clearly of particular int erest in human life .
3 Providing an extra m otive or reason, as discussed in Pettit 1995, n eed n ot m ean making it m ore likely t h at t h e person will beh ave in the manner r equired; he or she may already have I think that trust involves dynamic reliance of this kind, because the dynamic aspect provides a nice explanation for why trusting people involves treating them as trustworthy. If I am said to treat you as trustworthy, then I must be treating you in a way that manifests to you-and to any informed witnesses-that I am relying on you; otherwise it would not have the gestalt of treating you as trustworthy. And if I am said to treat you as trustworthy then, in addition, I must be manifesting the expectation that this will increase your reason for acting as I rely on you to act. The implicature of anyone's saying that I treat you as trustworthy is that I expect you to live up to the trust I am investing in you: that is, I expect that the fact that I am relying on you-the fact that I am investing trust in you-will give you more reason than you previously had to display the trait or behaviour required.
Relying on others is a generic kind of activity, then, trust in thesensein which I am concerned with it is a specific form of that generic kind. The difference that marks off trust from reliance, contrary to the suggestion mentioned, is not that trust is a non-rational version of reliance. Rather it is that trust is interactively dynamic in character. It materializes so far as the act of reliance involved is presented as an act of reliance to the trustee, and is presented in the manifest expectation that that will give the trustee extra reason to conform to the expectation.
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What of the connection to rationality? I argue that both reliance in general, and trust in particular, may be rational or irrational. While we illustrated reliance on other people by instances that were intuitively rational in character, enough reason and motive to ensure that they will behave in that way. I can raise the utility that a certain choice has for you, even when it already has much greater utility than any alternative.
nothing rules out cases of irrational reliance. Reliance will be irrational so far as the beliefs on which it is based arenot well grounded or, perhaps a less likely possibility, so far as they do not provide a good ground for the reliance that t h ey prompt. Trust is the species of reliance on other people that is inter actively dynamic in the sense explained and while this may certainly be ir ration al, it should be clear that it may be ra tional too. There m ay be good reason to expect that others will be motivated by my act of manifest reliance on them and so good reason to indulge in such reliance. I may t hink that they are n ot currently, independently disposed to act as I want them to act, for exam ple, but believe that my revealing that I am relying on their acting in t hat way will provide them with the required motive to do so.
The results we have covered are summed up in the tree d iagram a t tached and I hope that this will help to keep them in mind.
Two Forms of Trust
There are t wo broadly contrasted sorts of b eliefs on the basis of wh ich you might be led to trust others in a certain manner: say, trust t h em to tell the trut h on some question, or to keep a promise, or to respond to a r equ est for help.
You might believe that certain others are indeed trustworthy, in t he sense of b eing ant ecedently disposed to respond to certain m anifesta tions of r eliance. They may not be disposed a ntecedently to display the t rait or behav iour you want them to display but they a r e disposed to d o so, other things being equal, should you manifestly rely on them to do so. They are possessed of stable, ground-level d ispositions that you are able to engage by acts of manifest r eliance.
The dispositions in which you b elieve in this way would constit ute w hat we normally think of as v irtues. You might b elieve tha t it is possible t o engage some people by manifesting reliance on them b ecause they are loyal friends or associa tes, for example; or because they are kind and v irt uous t yp es who won 't generally want to letdown someon e wh o depends on t hem; or b ecause they are prudent and perceptive indiv iduals who will see the long-term benefits available to each of you from cooperation a nd w ill be prepared, t h erefore, t o build on the opportunity you provide by manifesting reliance on them.
But ther e is also a quite different sort of b eliefthat might p rompt you to trust certain others, manifesting r eliance in t he manifest expectation that they will prove reliable. You might think, not that those people a re curre ntly d isposed to r espond appropria tely, but r ather that they are disposed to form su ch a disposition under the stimulus provided by your making a r elevant overt ure of trust. You might think that they are m eta-disposed in this fashion to tell you t h e truth, or to keep a promise you elicit, or to provide some h elp you request. They may n ot be currently disposed in such d irections but they are disposed to become disposed to respond in those ways, should you m ake the required overture.
This second possibility is less straightforward than the first and I will d evote the r est of this section to elucidating it. The possibility is not just a logical possibility that is unlikely to be realized in practice. It materializes in common interactions as a result of people's desiring the good opinion of others and recognizing-as a matter of shared awareness, however tacit-that this is something that they each desire. It has a salient place within what Geoffrey Brennan and I describe as the economy of esteem (Brennan/Pettit 2004a ).
There are two fundamentally different sorts of goods t hat human beings seek for themselves. The one kind may be described as attitude-dependent, the other as action-dependent (Pettit 1993, chapter 5) . Attitude-dependent goods are those which a person can enjoy only so far as they are the object of certain attitudes, in particular certain positive attitudes, on the part of others, or indeed themselves. They are goods like being loved, being liked, being acknowledged, being respected, being admired, and so on. A ction-dependent goods are t h ose which a person can proeure without having to rely on t he presence of any particular attitudes in themselves or others; they are attained by t heir own effor ts, or the efforts of others, and they are attained regardless of t he attit udes at the origin of those efforts.
Action-dependent goods are illustrated by the regula r sor ts of services and commodities and resources to which economists give centre stage. B u t it sh ould b e clear tha t people care also about goods in the attit ude-depen dent category; they care about being cherish ed by others, for examp le, and about being well regarded by them. Thus Adam Smith, the founding father of econom ics, t h ought tha t the desire for the good opinion or est eem of others, the d esire for standing in the eyes of others, was one of the most b asic of human inclina tions.
"Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him wit h an original desire to please, a nd an original aver sion to offend his brethren. She t a ught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable r egard. She r endered their approbation most flatt ering a nd most agreeable to him for its own sake; a nd t heir disapprobation m ost mortifying a nd most offen sive." (Smith 1982, 116) In a rguing tha t people care a b out the esteem of others, Smith was part of a tradition going back to ancient sources, and a tradition t hat was particu larly powerful in t h e seventeenth and eighteenth cent mies (Lovejoy 1961) . I am going to assum e tha t he is right in thinking that people do seek t he good opinion of others, even if this desire is n ot any m ore basic t han their desire for material goods. M or e particularly, I am going to assume tha t w hile the good opinion of ot hers is certainly instrumental in procuring action-dependent goods, it is n ot desired just as a c urrency t hat can b e cash ed out in action-dep endent t erms. People will n aturally be prepared to trade off esteem for other goods but t h e less esteem t h ey h ave, t h e more r eluctant t h ey will be to trade; esteem is an independently attractive good by their lights, n ot just a proxy for material goods. 4 
P hilip Pettit
The desire for esteem can serve in the role of the meta-disposition of wh ich wespoke earlier. Let people want the esteem of others a nd t hey will be d isposed to become disposed to prove reliable in response to the t rusting manifestation of reliance. Or at least that will be the case in the event tha t the t r usting ma n ifestation of reliance normally serves to communicate a good opinion of t he trustee. And all the evidence suggests that it does serve this purpose, constitut ing a token of the trustor's esteem.
The act of relying on others in a suitable context is a way of displaying a belief that they are not the sort to let you down: they are trustwort hy, sa y in the modality of loyalty or virtue or prudencef perception. The trustor do es not typically utter words to the effect that the trustees are people w ho will not let the needy down: that the trustees, as we say, a re indeed t rust wort hy individuals. But what the trustor does in manifesting r eliance is ta ntamount to saying something of that sort. Let the context be one where, by common assumption, the trustor will expect the trustees to prov e relia ble in a certain way only if they have a modicum of trustworthiness: only if t he trustees are loyal or virtuous or prudentf perceptive or whatever. Undersuch a r outine assum ptionmore b elow on why it is routine-the act of trust w ill be a way of saying t h at the trustees are indeed ofthat trust worthy sort.
Indeed, since words a r e cheap a nd actions dear, the act of trust w ill b e something of ev en greater communicative significance. It will com municat e in the most credible curren cy availa ble to human b eings-in t he gold standard represented by action-that the trustor b elieves the t rust ees to b e t ruly trust wort hy: to b e truly the sorts of p eople who will not ta ke adv antage of someon e who p ut s hirnself or her self in their hands. It d oes not just r ecord t h e reality of t h at b elief, it sh ows that the b elief exist s . Thus Hobbes (1991, 64) can wr ite: "To b elieve, to trust, to r ely on a nother, is to Honour him: sign of opinion of h is v ert ue a nd power. T o distrust, or not b elieve, is to Dishon our."
Whe n it connect s in this way w ith the d esire of a good opinion , t h e act of trust h as a n importa nt m otivating asp ect for the trust ees. It makes clear to them tha t they enjoy the good opinion of the trustor-t he belief t h at t hey are trustworthy-but tha t they w ill lose tha t goo d opinion if t hey let t h e trustor d own. This m eans t h at the trustor h as a reason to ex pect the m anifestat ion of relia nce to b e p er su asive with the trustees, indep e ndently of a ny b elief in t h eir pre-existing loyalty or v irt u e or pruden ce. If the trustees value the good opinion of the trust or, which the m a nifest ation of relia nce reveals, t h en t hat is likely to give the m p a use a b out letting the trustor down , even if they are actually n ot pa rticularly loyal or v irtuous or prude ntf p er ceptive in character. Let the trustor d own and they may gain som e immedia t e advantage or save themselves som e immediate cost. But let the trust or d own and t h ey will for feit a n oth er immedia t e advantage: t h e salient b enefit of b eing well r egarded b y t h e trustor, as w ell as the other b en efits associa t ed with enjoying such a status.
But ther e is also m ore to say. When I display trust in cer tain other s, I ofte n dem onstra te to third parties tha t I trust these p eop le. Other things b eing equal, then, su ch a dem onstr ation w ill serve to win a good opinion for the trustees a m ong those witnesses; the d em onstration w ill a m ount t o testimony that the trustees are trustworthy. Indeed if the fact of such universal testimony is salient to all, the demonstration may not just cause everyone t o t hink well of the trustees; it may cause this to become a matter of common belief, with everyone believing it, everyone believing that everyone believes it, and so on. Assuming that such fac ts are going to be visible to any perceptive trustees, then, the existence of independe nt witnesses to the act of trust will p rovide further esteem-centred m otives for them to perform as expected. Let t h e t r ustor d own and not only will trustees lose the good opinion that t he t rustor has displayed; they will also lose the good opinion and the high status t h at t h e t rustor may have won for them a mong third parties.
The beliefthat someone is loyal or virtuous or prudent/ perceptive may explain why the risk-taking that trust involves may actually be quite sensible or ra tional. Certainly there is a risk involved in this or that act of trust but t he r isk is not substantial-it is, at the least, a rational gamble--given t hat the t rustee has those qualities. 5 What we now seeisthat the beliefthat certain parties desire esteem, and that responding appropriately to an overture of trustwill secure esteem for them, may equally explain why it is rational to trust t h ose people.
6 It d oes n ot direct us to any indep ende nt reason w hy t he trustees may be taken to b e a nteced ently reliable--any r eason of objective trust wort hiness-but it r eveals h ow the act of trust can transform the trust ee into reliable par ties, eliciting the disposition to perform appropriately. To manifest trusting r eliance is to pr ovid e normal, esteem-sensitive trustees with a n incentive to d o the very t hing wh ich the trustor is relying on them to d o. It is a sort of b ootstraps op eration, wh erein the trustor takes a risk and, by the ver y fact of taking t h at risk, shifts t he odds in his or her own favo ur.
Believing that certain individuals are loyal or virtuous or p rudent / p ercep tive is quite consistent, we should n otice, w ith believing that still in som e measure they desire the esteem of others. This is im p ortant b ecause it means that p eople may h ave double reason for trusting others. They m ay t r ust them both because t h ey think tha t they a re trust worthy a nd-a back-up consideration, as it were--b ecause t h ey think tha t they w ill savour the esteem t h a t goes with proving relia ble a nd being thou ght to b e trustworthy. I said earlier that t o t r ust certain others is to treat them as trustworthy. When one t rusts t h em in the standard way, on e treat s them as trustworthy in the sense of acting ou t of a b elief t h at they are trustworthy. W h en on e trusts them on the esteem-related basis, one 5 For the record, I think that the risk involved in the act of trust need not be a risk of the ordinary, probabilist ic kind (Pettit 1995) . Take the case where I a.m dealing w ith others whom I believe to be more or less certa.in of responding appropriately to an act of manifest reliance on my part; let m y degree of confidence that they are r eli able in this way be as near as you like t o 1. I can still b e sa.id t o trust such people , sofaras I put m y fa te in t h eir hand s w h en I r ely on them. I do n ot expose m yself to a significant probability that they w ill b etray me -that probability may approach 0 -but I do expose myself t o the accessibility of b etrayal to th em ; I expose myself to t h eir having the freedom to betray m e. H ere I break with Russell Hardin 1992, 507, and join with Rich ard Holton 1994.
treats them as if they were trustworthy, whether as a matter of fact they are trustworthy or not.
One final issue. The esteem-related way in which trust m ay materialize depends on its going without saying-its being a matter of r outine assumption shared among people--that when a trustor invests trust in a t rust ee, t hat is because of taking the trustee to be trustworthy. But isn't it likely t h at p eople will recognize that in many cases the trustor invests trust because of taking the trustee to want his or her esteem, or the esteem of witnesses, not because of taking the person to be antecedently trustworthy? And in that case won't the mechanism we have been describing be undermined? P eople are n ot going to expect to attract esteem for proving reliable, if they expect t hat their proving reliable will be explained by the trustor, and by witnesses, as a n effect of t h eir wanting to win that esteem. They will expect to attract esteem on ly if t h ey think that their proving reliable will be generally explained by t he assumption that they are trustworthy types: by the at tribution of stable dispositions like loyalty or virtue or prudence/perception.
Is there any special reason tothinkthat the system won't unravel in this way, and that it w ill continue to go w ithout saying-it will continue to be a matter of common assump tion-that people w ho prove relia ble und er over tures of t r ust will enjoy the attribution of estimable, t rustworthy dispositions? I believe there is. The assumption is going to rem ain in place as lon g as people a r e subject to the fundamental a ttribution error or bias, as psychologists call it, a nd so are likely to expect everyone to conform to that pattern of attribution. And a firm tradition of psychological thou ght suggests that t he bias is deeply and undisplaceably ingrained in our n ature.
E. E. Jones (1990, 138) gives forceful expression to the v iew that the bias h as this sort of hold upon us: "I have a candidate for the m ostrobust and repeatable finding in social psychology: the t endency to see behavior as caused by a stable p ersonal disposition of the actor wh en it can b e just as easily explained as a natural resp onse to more than adequate situational pressure." This findi ngtha t people a re deeply prone to the fundamental attribution bias-su pports t h e idea that, even if they are conscious of their own sensitivity to a for ce like t h e desire for esteem (Miller/ Prentice 1996, 804) , people will be loathe t o t race the b eh aviour of others to such a situation al pressure. They are much m ore likely to explain t h e behaviour by ascribing a corresponding disposition t o t h em. And t h at b eing so, they a re likely t o expect each t o do the same, t o expect t hat each will exp ect each to do the same, a nd so on in the usual hier archy. Thus t h ey are likely to expect t hat trustors will invest trust in certain others only so far as they take those oth ers to h ave the sta ble personal dispositions associated with trustworthiness.
The Internet
And so, finally, to the connection between trust and the Internet. The question that I want to raise is whether the Internet offers a milieu within which relations of trust-trust as distinct from reliance--can rationally develop. There is every reason, of course, why people who already enjoy such relations with one another should be able to express and elicit trust in one another over t he Internet. But the question is whether the Internet offers the sort of ecology within w hich trust can rationally form and strengthen in the absence of face-to-face or other contact. Is it a space in which I might rationally make myself reliant on others by sharing difficult secrets, asking their advice about personal problems, exposing myself financially in some proposal, and so on?
We distinguished in the last section between two sorts of bases on which trust may emerge in general. The primary basis for trust is t he belief t h at certain people are trustworthy: that is, have stable dispositions like loyalty and virtue and prudence/ perception. Primary trust will be rational just in case that belief is rational and serves rationally to control what the t rustor does. The secondary basis for trust is the belief that even if the people in question are not trustworthy--even if they do not have stable dispositions of the kind mentioned-they are meta-disp osed to display the trait or behaviour that the trustor r elies on them, now in this instance, now in t hat, t o display. M ore concretely, they d esire esteem a nd they can be moved by the esteem communica ted by an act of trust-and p erha ps broadcast to others-into becoming d isposed to be or act as the trustor wants them to be or act. The secondary form of t rust that is prompted in this manner will b e rational just in case the belief in the esteem-seeking meta-disposition is rational and serves rationally to sh a p e the trustor's overture.
Does the Internet offer a framework for t h e r a tional formation of prima ry trust? In particular, does it provide an e nvironment w h ere I may rationally come to think that someone I encounter only in that milieu is a likely t o respond as a loyal or v irtuous or even prudent/ perceptive person? Or does it offer a framework for the rational forma tion of secondary trust? Does it en able me to recognize and activate another's d esire for esteem, creating a ground for expecting that he or she will respond favourably to my trusting displays of esteem?
There is no problern with the p ossibility of the Internet facilitating r ational reliance, as distinct from trust. Suppose I become aware of som eone over email or in a chat room or v ia the web. And imagine that an opportunity arises wh ere I will find it rational to do something---say, go to a proposed meeting place--only if ther e is reason to b elieve tha t the other p er son will act in a ce rtain way: in this case, be at t h e proposed place to m eet me. I may not have very much solid eviden ce available a bout that p erson over the Internet---deception is not easily d etectable--but there is nothing to block the possibility t h at what evid ence I h ave makes it r a tional for m e to rely on their doing this or that; what evidence I have makes that a ration al gamble.
attribution bias: a tendency to take people to employ an attributionist heurist ic in interpreting and de aling with others.
But reliance is one thing, trust another. Ta ke the question of primary t r ust first of all. Is it ever likely to be the case, with the individu als I encoun ter on the Internet, and on the Internet only, that I can come to t hink of t h em as loyal or virtuous or even prudent/ perceptive: that is, capable of r ecognizin g and responding to a sense of the long-term interests that they and I may have in cooperating with one a nother? And is it ever likely to be possible for me to invest trust rationally in such contacts?
I think not. Consider the ways in which I come t o for m beliefs about loyalty and virtue and prudence/perception in everyday life. I may r ely in the formation of such beliefs on at least three distinct sources of evidence. F irst, t he evidence available to me as I see and get cued~no doubt a t subpersonalas well as personal levels of awareness~to the expressions, the gestures, the words, t h e looks of people: in a phrase, their bodily presence. Call this the evidence of face. Second, the evidence available to me as I see the person in interaction with ot hers, enjoying the testimony of their assocation and support: in particular, see them connecting in this way with others whom I already know and cr edit. Call this the evidence of fra me. And third, the evidence tha t accumulates in t h e record t h at I will normally maintain, however unconsciously, about their behav iour towards me and towards others over time. Call this the eviden ce r egistered in a personal file on the people involved.
The striking thing ab out Inte rnet contact isthat it does n ot allow m e to avail myself of such bodies of evidence, wh ether of face, frame or file. The contact whose address and words reach my screen is only a virtual presence, albeit a presence I may dress up in the images that fa nstasy supplies. I can not r ead the face of such a contact; the person is a sp ectral, not a bodily presence in my life. Nor can I see evidence of his or he r character~and I won 't be able to est ablish independently wh ether 'his' or 'her' is appropriate---in the interactions the person e nj oys with other persons familiar to me, assuming that such witnesses will b e themselves only spectral presences in my experie nce. And nor , finally, w ill I be able to keep a file on the performance of the person over time, whet her with me or with others. There won't be a ny way of tracking t h a t person for sure, since a given person may assum e m any addresses a nd the address of on e person can be mimicked by others.
Not only do these problem s stand in the way of my being able to judge t h at a pure Internet contact is loyal or v irtuous or prudent/perceptive. They are compounded by t h e fact that such problems, as I am in a p osition t o see, will also stand in the way of oth ers w h en they try to read a n d r elate to m e. For them I w ill b e just a spectral presence, as t hey are spectral presences for m e. Our voices m ay call out over the Internet, but it won't ever b e clear where they come from or to wh om they belong. They will be like a chorus of lost cries, seeking in vain t o p in one another down. Or at least that is what they will be like, absent the illusions that fantasy may weave as it claims to find str ucture and stability in the shifts of the kaleidoscope.
On the Inte rnet , to put these problems in summary form, we all wear the ring of Gyges. P lato took up an old myth in asking whether we would be likely to r emain virtuous, did we have access to a ring that would give us power, on wearing it, to become invisible and undetectable to others. That myth becomes reality on the Internet for, with a little ingenuity, any one of us may make contact with another under one address and then, slipping that name, present ourselves under a second or third address and try to manipulate the other's responses to the first. That we exist under the second or t hird address may n ot be undetectable to the other in such a case but that it is we who do so-that we have the same identity-certainly will be undetectable.
In view of these difficulties, I think that the possibility of rational, primary trust in the virtual space of the Internet is only of vanishing significance. It is a space in which voices sound out of the dark, echoing to us in a void where it is never clear who is who and what is what. Or at least t hat is so when we enter the Internet without connection to existing, real-world n etworks of association and friendship.
But what of secondary trust? Are the prospects any better here t hat we will be able to reach out to one another in the environment of the Internet and forge relationships of trust? I think not. I may be able to assume, as a gen eral truth about human nature, that those with whom I make contact are likely to savour esteem, including the esteem of someone like methat t h ey don ' t yet fully know. But how can I think that anything I do in manifesting r eliance w ill seem to make est eem available t o them, whether it be my own esteem or t he esteem of independent witnesses?
The problern h ere derives from the problems that j eopardize t he possibility of primary trust. I am blocked from ra tionally forming the b eliefthat an Internet contact is loyal or virtuous or prudentjperceptive, as we saw. Since t hat blocking is something that anyone is in a position to recognize, oth ers w ill see that it is in place, and I will b e positioned to recognize tha t they will see t his . And t h at being so, I will have no ground to think that othe rs---other pure Internet con tact s-are likely to t a ke an act of manifest reliance on my p a rt as an expression of the belief tha t they are p eople of proven or eve n r ationally presum ed loyalty or v irt u e or prudencej perception. I will h ave no ground for expecting t hem to take my act of trust as a toke n of personal esteem.
Nor is there a ny way out of this difficulty available by r ecourse to the possibility of witnesses. For as those on wh om I bestow trust will be un a b le to see my manifestation of r eliance as a token of est eem, so the witn esses to my act will b e equally prevented from viewing it in that way. The addressees and the witnesses of my act may see it as a rather stupid, perhaps even pathetic att empt to make contact. Or if the act promises a possible b en efit to m e at a loss t o the addressees-as in the case of emails that propose various finan cial scams-they may see it as a rather obvious at tempt at manipulation and fraud. And t hat just about exh austs the possibilities. If I try to invest trust in others unknown to me outside the Internet, then the profile I assume will have to be that of the idiot or the trick st er. Not a happy choice.
The claims I have been making may strike some as exaggerated. But if they do, that may be beca use of a confusion between what I d escribed a t the beginning of t h e paper as Internet trust b etween real people-my topic h ereand Interne t trust b etween Internet p eople: that is, b etween p ersonas t h at we real individuals construct on Internet forums. If I construct an agony aunt persona on an Internet forum, then in that persona I may succeed over time in earning---earning, not just winning-the trust of those who, in t h e guise of other Internet identities, seek my guidance. This form of trust is of great interest and opens up possibilities of productive human r elationsh ips but it is not the phenomenon that I have been discussing here. My concern has been wit h h ow far real people can manage, on the basis of pure Internet contact, to est ablish trust in one another. And the a nswer to which I a m driven is that t hey cann ot effectively do so. The message of the paper, in a word used by Hubert Dreyfus (2001), isthat 'telepresence' is not enough on its own to mediate t he appearance of rational trust between real people.
One concluding word of caution, h owever. I have argued for this claim on t h e assumption that telepresence will remain as Gygean as it currently t h is: t h at it will continue to lack the facial salience, the framed support, and t h e fileable identities available in regular encounters with other people. I am n o fut ur ist , however, and I cannot say that telepresence will always r emain constrained in these ways. Perhaps lurking out there in the future of our species is an a r rangement under which telepresence can assume firmer, mor e assuring forms and can serve to m edia t e rational trust. I do n ot say that such a brave new world is logically impossible. I only say tha t it has not yet a rriv ed. 8
